English invasion of Scotland (1400)

The English invasion of Scotland of August 1400 was the first military campaign undertaken by Henry IV of England after deposing the previous king, his cousin Richard II. Henry IV desired to urgently defend the Anglo-Scottish border, and to overcome his predecessor's legacy of failed military campaigns.

A large army was assembled and marched into Scotland, but no pitched battle was ever attempted. Henry's army left at the end of the summer after only a brief stay, mostly camped near Leith (in Edinburgh) where it could maintain contact with its supply fleet. The campaign ultimately accomplished little except to further deplete the king's coffers, and is historically notable only for being the last one led by an English king on Scottish soil.

Background

Henry IV of England

Although war with Scotland had started under Edward I,^[1] cross-border raids and fighting had been the norm in Anglo-Scottish relations since the 1370s, mainly as a result of Scottish attacks.^[2] The 1399 revolution created further opportunity for Scotland to regain the land between the River Tweed and the Solway Firth; as Given-Wilson has put it, 'England's confusion was Scotland's opportunity.'^[3] In May 1399 Wark Castle was destroyed by a Scottish incursion.^[4]

Although it has been suggested that Henry 'hoped to maintain peaceful relations',^[5] the English were not averse to a pre-emptive strike either. In particular the Percys – the Earl of Northumberland and his son Henry Percy (Hotspur) – who were Wardens of the East and West March, saw a Scottish war as an opportunity for dynastic aggrandisement. Indeed, contemporaries believed that the invasion was instigated by them, and the King had to deny it, in person, to the English parliament in November 1399.^[6] Brown has suggested that this indicates the personal interest the King felt in the affair: that this was in fact his own personal plan, 'that it meant a lot to him, and that it had met with criticism.'^[7]

Perhaps more persuasive to Henry than the wishes of his northern nobility were divisions within the Scottish nobility; George Dunbar, Earl of March, felt that he had been betrayed by the then regent, Robert Stewart, Duke of Albany, over the proposed marriage and subsequent jilting of Dunbar's daughter, and his 'outraged honour.'^[8] 'One of the finest soldiers of his age, until now an implacable enemy' of England,^[9] Dunbar travelled to England and pledged allegiance to Henry IV. Thus, when Henry invaded Scotland, he did so accompanied by not just a physical symbol of Scottish divisions, but one of Scotland's greatest military commanders.^[9]

The campaign

Arms of George Dunbar, Earl of March

Although Henry had announced his plans at the November 1399 parliament, he did not attempt a winter campaign, but continued quasi-negotiations 'in which he must have felt the Scots were profoundly irritating.'^[10] In June 1400, the king summonsed his Duchy of Lancaster retainers to muster at York,^[9] and they in turn brought their retinues.^[11] At this point, with the invasion being obvious to all, the Scots attempted to re-open negotiations. Although Scottish ambassadors arrived at York around 26 June, they returned to Scotland within two weeks.^[10]

Although the army was summoned to assemble at York on 24 June, it did not approach Scotland until mid-August. The was due to the gradual arrival of army supplies (in some cases, with much delay — the King's own tents, for example, were not despatched from Westminster until halfway through July). Brown suggests that Henry was well aware of the delays these preparations would cause the campaign.^[12] The army left York on 25 July^[12] and reached Newcastle-upon-Tyne four days later;^[9] it was plagued by shortages of supplies, particularly food, of which more had to be requested before even leaving York.^[12] As the campaign progressed, bad weather exacerbated the problem of food shortages, and Brown has speculated that this was an important consideration in the short duration of the expedition.^[13]

It has been estimated that Henry's army was around 13,000 men,^[14] of which 800 men-at-arms and 2000 archers came directly from the royal Household.^[5] This was a sizable force: in context, Brown notes that whilst it was smaller than the massive army assembled in 1345 (that would fight the Battle of Crécy), it was larger than most organised for French service.^[15] The English fleet also patrolled the east coast of Scotland in order to besiege Scottish trade and to resupply the army.^[16] At least three convoys were sent from London and the Humber, the first of which delivered 100 tonnes of flour and ten of sea salt to the army in Scotland.^[17]

Henry crossed the border in mid-August.^[9] Given-Wilson has noted Henry's concern not to ravage or pillage the countryside as they marched through Berwickshire and Lothian, in marked contrast to previous expeditions (for instance, he says, the 'devastation wreacked' by Richard II's 1385 expedition); he puts this down to the presence of Dunbar, whose lands they were.^[18] Brown has suggested the king 'envisaged ... a punitive expedition' with either a confrontation or such a chevauchée that the Scots would be eager to negotiate. In the event, they offered no resistance as the English army marched through Haddington.^[19]

However, Henry's army never advanced further than Leith, for there the army could keep in physical contact with the supporting fleet;^[20] Henry took a personal interest in the situation of the convoys, at one point even verbally instructing that two Scottish fishermen fishing in the Firth of Forth were to be paid £2 for their (unspecified) assistance.^[17] Furthermore, Henry never besieged Edinburgh Castle where the Duke of Rothsay was ensconced.^[20] By now, Brown says, Henry's campaign had been reduced to a 'war of words.'^[19] By 29 August, the English army had returned to the other side of the border.^[20]

Aftermath

Sadler has described this expedition as 'like so many of its predecessors, fail[ing] to yield any significant results,' neither forcing the Scots onto a battlefield nor making any major territorial gains. Brown too has described the campaign as 'utterly futile.'^[4] This Sadler puts down at least in part to their reliance on a Fabian strategy to wear out the English whilst avoiding confrontation.^[16] Henry's lacklustre campaign was condemned by contemporaries, with Welsh chronicler Adam of Usk saying that the Scots did more damage to the English than had been done to them,^[21] and the Scotichronicon suggesting that 'nothing worthy of remembrance was done' by their enemies.^[22]

The king had been 'desperately short of money' in February, before the campaign had begun,^[11] and was left even shorter; the campaign had cost at least £10,000,^[23] but had yielded nothing in booty or ransom.^[24] Still needing to pay his army's wages – the merchant sailors' wages alone were £500 – and with the crown now a few thousand pounds further in debt,^[25] a parliament was summoned for York. Before either end had been achieved the Glyndŵr Rising, which continued for the rest of Henry's reign, had begun in Wales.^[26] The campaign was the last one led by an English king in Scotland.^[23]

References

• Brown, A. L., 'The English Campaign in Scotland', in British Government and Administration: Studies Presented to S. B. Chrimes eds. Hearder, H. & H.R. Loyn (Cardiff, 1974)