Packard Commission

Title page of the Final Report of the Packard Commission to the President.

The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management also known as the Packard Commission was a federal government commission by President Ronald Reagan, created by Executive Order 12526 to study several areas of management functionality within the Department of Defense of the United States. It was chaired by David Packard.

Background

Beginning in 1981, President Ronald Reagan began an expansion in the size and capabilities of the United States armed forces, which entailed major new expenditures on weapons procurement. By the mid-1980s, this spending became a scandal when the Project On Government Oversight reported that the Pentagon had vastly overpaid for a wide variety of items, most notoriously paying $435 for a hammer,[1] $600 for a toilet seat, and $7,000 for a aircraft coffee maker.[2]

In response to these scandals, President Reagan appointed a commission chaired by David Packard to study government procurement undertaken by the United States Department of Defense. The Commission consisted of Packard, Ernest C. Arbuckle, Robert H. Barrow, Nicholas F. Brady, Louis W. Cabot, Frank Carlucci, William P. Clark, Jr., Barber Conable, Paul F. Gorman, Carla Anderson Hills, James L. Holloway III, William Perry, Robert T. Marlow, Charles J. Pilliod, Jr., Brent Scowcroft, Herbert Stein, and R. James Woolsey, Jr.[3] The President tasked the Commission with studying defense management policies and procedures, including:

“ the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command system, the Military Departments, and the Congress.[4] ”

Recommendations

The Packard Commission reported that there was at present "no rational system" governing defense procurement; it concluded that it was not fraud and abuse that led to massive overexpenditures, but rather "the truly costly problems are those of overcomplicated organization and rigid procedure."[5]

The Commission made several recommendations: (1) that defense appropriations should be passed by the United States Congress in two-year budgets rather than annual appropriations bills; (2) the creation of a "procurement czar", to be known as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and the creation of a clear hierarchy of acquisition executives and managers in each of the services.; (3) the theater commanders should report directly to the United States Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (4) the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be strengthened.[5]

Many of the recommendations by the commission were used when Congress reformed the Joint Chiefs of Staff system in 1986 with the Goldwater–Nichols Act.

See also

References

  1. ↑ "The case for the $435 hammer. - Free Online Library". www.thefreelibrary.com. Retrieved 2016-04-13.
  2. ↑ Meyer, David S. (1990-01-01). A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780275933067.
  3. ↑ http://www.ndia.org/Advocacy/AcquisitionReformInitiative/Documents/Packard-Commission-Report.pdf Final Report of the Packard Commission, June 1986
  4. ↑ http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/71585c.htm Executive Order 12526 -- President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
  5. 1 2 Thomas, Evan (1986-03-10). "Defensive About Defense". Time. ISSN 0040-781X. Retrieved 2016-04-13.

External links

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 10/11/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.