CIA activities in Vietnam

CIA activities in Vietnam were operations by the Central Intelligence Agency in Indochina and then Vietnam from the 1950s to the late 1960s, before and during the Vietnam war. There are 174 National Intelligence Estimates dealing with Vietnam, issued by the CIA after coordination with the intelligence community of the US government.[1]

Vietnam 1945–1947

Prior to World War II, Vietnam had been part of a larger French colony named Indochina. During the war, the Imperial Japanese Army, conquered Vietnam and remained there until 1945, when the Axis powers were defeated. The Japanese were removed from Vietnam with the help of revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh forces.[2] Following the war, France intended to retake the Indochina region and reassert its former dominance. Much of this can be traced back to a desire to restore French glory and national pride after the humiliation the nation suffered during the course of World War II. The French also wished to reclaim the Indochina region to regain control over the vast rubber plantations across the country.

The people of Vietnam were completely against the return of the French in Vietnam. The Vietnamese experienced a lot of abuses by the French during their colonization of Vietnam in the mid 19th century. The people of North Vietnam especially rallied around revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh and looked to him to gain at long last, their independence.[3]

The French spent nine years (1946–54) attempting to regain control of Vietnam. The Vietnamese used military and political tactics to push and expel the French from their lands. Northern Vietnamese troops were prepared to fight the French to the bitter end in order to ensure victory and their freedom. After suffering a major defeat at the French's jungle fortress of Dein Bein Phu on May 7, 1954, the French military influence in Asia came to an end.

Even before the CIA was formed, a team from the OSS, and its successors that would later become the CIA, under Major Archimedes Patti, was in French Indochina, assessing the situation, and discussing alternatives with parties on all sides, including Ho Chi Minh.[4]

Vietnam 1950–1954

Vietnam 1950–1953 CIA officers moved to French Indochina as a part of the legation of the United States in the city of Saigon. After their arrival, CIA involvement expanded to a new large base in Hanoi. The CIA's activities in Vietnam did not grow any further due to the French discouraging CIA activity (the French were still clinging to the idea that they could one day still dominate Vietnam and the US was against this course of action). During 1953-1954, the involvement of the CIA had increased when the French finally obliged the US assistance with the unconventional warfare activities (the French were facing large and costly losses at the hands of what would become the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese resistance forces)[5] The primary aid offered by the US was military aid that was then greatly expanded from the Eisenhower administration.[6]

There was a reestablishment of a cover action section in Saigon Station. there was also a uUnilateral covert action which was suspended in 1953 under State Department pressure. This was due to the French exposing paramilitary operations against the Vietminh in Hanoi in which the agency did not clear with them.[7] The CIA's mission in Saigon was to directly assess the nationalist politicians.[8] The primary cause and motivation behind the intervention of the US and CIA was to gather intelligence, and provide interpretations of the events that occurred in Indochina. Also, the agency's broad span of activities reached into almost every aspect of the Indochina war. The agency conducted several paramilitary programs and conducted a full-scale war in Laos and South Vietnam.[6]

Vietnam 1954

Covert action

The initial CIA team in Saigon was the Saigon Military Mission, headed by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, who arrived on 1 June 1954. His diplomatic cover job was Assistant Air Attaché. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage and train South Vietnamese in the arts of psychological warfare, just like he had done in an earlier conflict in the Philippines. Although, Lansdale worked for the OSS briefly in World War II, he was never a CIA employee.[7][9]

Working in close cooperation with the U.S. Information Agency, a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat psy-war was constructed (under the guidance of Lansdale and his team) and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it. This program would have some great successes, but unfortunately the CIA became more focused on troop movements of the enemy rather than waging a psy-war.

One such example of psychological warfare dealt directly with misinformation. Lansdale would later recall the event in his memoirs. "The first idea was used just before the French quit the city of Hanoi and turned over control to the Vietminh. At the time, the Communist apparatus inside the city was busy with secret plans to ready the population to welcome the entry of Vietminh troops. I suggested that my nationalist friends issue a fake Community manifesto, ordering everyone in the city except essential hospital employees to be out on the streets not just for a few hours of welcome but for a week-long celebration. In actuality this would mean a seven-day work stoppage. Transportation, electric power, and communication services would be suspended. The simple enlargement of plans already afoot should give the communists an unexpectedly vexing problem as they started their rule."[10] The celebration did not last a week. The Communists thought that this manifesto was French counterpropoganda and attempted to order everyone back to work, which took three days.[10]

The second SMM member, Major Lucien Conein, arrived on July 1. A paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, he was the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. In August, he went to Hanoi with the assignment of developing a paramilitary organization in the north.... A second paramilitary team for the south was formed, with Army LT Edward Williams doing double duty as the only experienced counter-espionage officer, working with revolutionary political groups.

Intelligence analysis

Working with available data, the CIA produced a National Intelligence Estimate in August. It began by stating that the Communist signing of the Geneva agreements had legitimized them, and they would need to immediately move to control the North while planning for long-term control of the country.

This National Intelligence Estimate went on to suggest that while the Diem government was in official control of the South (though remained unpopular because of a disconnect of the government from the people), certain pro-French elements may have been planning to overthrow it (Vietnam and France were already at allow point in their relationship). Vietminh elements would remain in the South and create an underground resistance force, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations.[11]

On October 26, 1954, Lansdale lured two key personnel in a planned coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem out of the country. Lansdale invited Hinh and staff to visit the Philippines.

US personnel dealing with the Government of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. Though it can be argued that the CIA did not make an effort to gain a better understanding of the history and people of Vietnam. The CIA instead focused on the military forces rather than the political and economic forces that motivated them.[12] The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on."[9]

Vietnam 1955

By 31 January 1955, a paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Directorate of Support.

Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu had been exploited by the help of CIA advisors to help defeat one of the challenges to the new Prime Minister's authority.

Lansdale and the South Vietnamese leader of the time, Ngo Dienh Diem, though working together, did not agree on the government system they wanted. August 1955, Lansdale brought Juan Orendain, a constitutional scholar, to Saigon in order to sway Diem in a direction similar to the American system. Orendain was a Filipino. Lansdale had just had experienced success in psy-war in the Philippines to displace communist influence there. He was hoping he could do the same with Diem as he had done working with Magsaysay in the Philippines. Part of this meant proposing a legislature and a judicial system to signal that Diem was open to checks and balances, and was not trying to be underhanded with his office. By April 1956 Diem had considered and yet rejected this model, and was more concerned about the authority he needed at that immediate time. All the while Lansdale had little to no real oversight from the rest of the CIA as these actions were taking place. Though he took advantage of this autonomy to improvise, it also meant he had little to no backup to enforce or further persuade Diem into a governmental separation of powers.[13]

During one encounter in early 1955, Diem rejected US ambassadorial representative J. Lawton Collins's nominee for commander of the Vietnamese Army. Collins wanted competence, whereas Diem preferred someone loyal.

On April 27, 1955 the Battle of Saigon had begun. The private crime syndicate Binh Xuyen and the Vietnamese National Army would wage conflict for around a month in Cholon. The Binh Xuyen were largely defeated early on in the conflict. Diem had issued them an ultimatum to come under control or be eliminated. The damage caused by the fighting resulted in around a thousand casualties, and tens of thousands more homeless.

Operation Brotherhood, created by Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines, had its first medical team late 1954. by 1955, it had more than 100 doctors and nurses at 10 medical center locations in South Vietnam to treat refugees and to train Vietnamese medical personnel. the second pacification operation was launched late April 1955 in the southern Dinh Dinh and northern Phu Yen portion of Central Vietnam. Lansdale claims to persuade Diem to name as its commander an officer that was capable.[7]

Vietnam 1959

Northern Vietnamese troops needed a way to link themselves with their allies in Southern Vietnam. The Viet Cong and Northern Vietnamese soldiers were able to supply troops and military operations through secret tunnels and the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Ho Chi Minh trail was an interlocking trail system that was created through the borders of Laos and Cambodia that reach from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. During the construction of this trail, native guides had to be used to guide the Northern Vietnamese troops through the wild country side. Campsites that were built along the side of the trail grew into way points for troops to gather and rest at. The trailed reached 800 miles long and could take up to three months to travel by foot.

In attempts to combat troop and supply movement along the trail, the CIA and US military set up heat and movement sensors along the trail to track enemy movement. US forces also attempted to use air dropped listening devices to track enemy troops and pinpoint Viet Cong movements.

The US and CIA had very few contracts in the Viet Cong ranks and Northern Vietnam. Many of the contacts that they had were double agents run by the Viet Cong. Much of the intelligence gathered regarding Northern Vietnam was unreliable. US and Southern Vietnamese military personal believed that the bulk of Northern Vietnamese supplies were being shipped over the Ho Chi Minh trail, however, more than 80 percent of Northern supplies were sent by sea.

Vietnam 1961

In April 1961, Lansdale, who had been designated the Operations Officer for an interagency Task Force in charge of political, military, economic, psychological, and covert character, was to go to Vietnam. Changes of policy in Washington however, transferred these responsibilities to the military and diplomats, and Lansdale was no longer involved with Vietnam.

CIA begins to sponsor and train the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) in the South Central Highlands. These were local defense operations with a mobile support component, "Mike Force", made up primarily of Nung mercenaries. Most CIDG units eventually became Vietnamese Rangers. These forces were intended to help combat the guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong.

Vietnam 1963

The following Wikipedia article recounts allegations that CIA smuggled opium from Western Vietnam to the US in order to fund covert operations:

In November 1963, the CIA, or "the Station", was relied upon by Vietnamese generals, who had recently staged a coup, to aid in the set up of a new regime. The Station was coming out of a US Mission moratorium on contacts with the new leadership imposed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

Vietnam 1964

Intelligence analysis

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) issued in May theorized that a short but intense air and naval campaign against the DRV would deter an invasion of the South, although not stop activities there. It also estimated that this would be a strong morale boost to the RVN.[14] The campaign described, however, was different than the actual gradual attacks that resulted from the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August. This tactic failed spectacularly, as it drove the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to use vicious guerrilla tactics against the US.

In October, another, less optimistic SNIE was issued, limited to the South. It said the situation was deteriorating, and a coup could occur at any time. The Prime Minister of the country, General Nguyen Khanh, stayed in power by placating various groups, while exhibiting little leadership of the country or the military. Defeatism was spreading from Saigon to the countryside, and was aggravated by a Montagnard revolt on September 20. No clear leadership was emerging. Much of this turmoil can be traced back to the Diem government and its inability to capture the hearts of the people like Ho Chi Minh had. The South Vietnamese government was completely detached from its people as much of its government was focused in Saigon (though most of the people lived in small villages and Hamlets in the countryside).[15]

The Vietcong, however, were not seen to be planning an immediate takeover, but are concentrating on psychological operations to increase unrest in the south and among American forces.[16]

Vietnam 1965

Intelligence analysis

Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-9-65, was done to assess the reactions, in various parts of the world, to an escalation of US attacks on North Vietnam. This estimate is especially significant in the conflict between the White House and the military & intelligence community.[17]

Vietnam 1967

Covert action

The Phoenix Program was an attempt to attack the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) with a "rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI." In that the VCI, as opposed to the main force VC/NVA combat forces, used terror against villagers, Phoenix can be considered a counterterror program using some of the same methods as its opponents. The main targets of this program were taking out the hierarchy of officials, guerrilla leaders,and local organization. The idea behind it was if the villages fell, as well as social order, the North Vietnamese would have to give in to American wills.

The creation of the Phoenix Program came as a result of a decade-long negligence on the part of the United States to track the activities of the Communist Party's political and administrative structure. From 1954-1964, the only intelligence offered by CIA efforts came in the form of a Hamlet Informant Program, which paid for information from untrained informants. Due to a lack in quality information, the CIA Station joined MACV J-2 and USOM's Public Safety Division in emphasizing a restructuring of intelligence. The Station wanted more centralization of intelligence, but US generals initially refused to offer a joint partnership in the efforts. As a result of this chasm in CIA and military intelligence efforts, the CIA broadened the National Interrogation Center for use by all security and intelligence operations. This change in strategy led to early successes, including the arrest of ninety-seven suspects identified under insurgent auspices, thanks in large part to information shared by police forces.[18]

"Staffing of the advisory Phoenix program, meanwhile, was completed, at least in Saigon. The CIA contribution began with COS and Deputy COS membership on Komer's Phoenix Committee. It included, as already noted, Evan Parker as program director, and its Executive Officer, Chief of Operations, an analyst, and two secretaries also came from the Station. For the most part, Station participation in Phoenix staffing entailed a second hat for an Agency officer already working against the VCI. As Phoenix Chief of Operations, for example, John Hart assigned to CORDS the chief of his Intelligence Operations Division (lOD), which conducted joint operations with the Police Special Branch. The entire division adopted CORDS cover under the title Revolutionary Development Cadre/Plans, in the same way that the Cadre Operations Division had joined CORDS as RDC/Operations."[19] Director, ICEX Staff (Parker's name excised). Memorandum for Acting Chief of Station, "Direct Station Involvement in the ICEX Program," 10 December 1967, East Asia Division Job 7.6.(.J0600R, B'.lX 3

While Phoenix has often been called a CIA program, that is not entirely correct. It was under the direction of William Colby, who had been Saigon Deputy CIA Station Chief, and then Station Chief, between 1959 and 1962. He returned to Vietnam in 1968, as deputy to Robert Komer, the civilian head of the American efforts against the Communists, called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Shortly after arriving, Colby succeeded Komer as head of CORDS, which drew on a wide range of US and South Vietnamese organizations, including the CIA station's Rural Development cadre.[20]

There were many allegations of torture among The Phoenix Program. Such tactics included were: rape, gang rape, rape using eels, snakes, or hard objects, and rape followed by murder; electric shock ('the Bell Telephone Hour') rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body, like the tongue; the 'water treatment'; the 'airplane' in which the prisoner's arms were tied behind the back, and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling, suspending the prisoner in midair, after which he or she was beaten; beatings with rubber hoses and whips; the use of police dogs to maul prisoners.[21]

The Phoenix Program can be called a resounding failure. Many of those people who were captured and put into prison or who were executed were indeed not high ranking communists, but were instead average citizens. Many neighbors would turn in individuals who were their personal enemies, people who owed them money or with whom they had other types of problems. American troops would commonly buy into these stories. Many of the victims of The Phoenix Program were indeed innocent.[22]

Military action

The US countered Viet Cong tactics through the use of prison camps, assassinations, and psychological warfare. The CIA planted sabotaged explosive Budweiser and poisoned cigarettes along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The CIA extracted letters from communist bodies and used them as methods to gain intelligence.

Vietnam 1969

Mixed covert action and intelligence collection

Katrosh wanted Theiu and Ky to get along, so that "there would finally be political cohesion in south Vietnam",and ended up using the CIA as the main proponent to help make this happen. Eventually, Katrosh was successful in bringing the two together for the Lien Minh inauguration. Theiu did not want to be personally involved with the Lien Minh organizational activity. Bunker wanted Katrosh's help with pursuing him, so he was sending large sums of CIA money, in the amount of $400,000 to Katrosh.[23]

Neither the CIA nor the military really wanted Phoenix. A footnote to a report on the program may be more to the point than the main report[24]

On December 15 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird met with George A. Carver, Jr., the DCI’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. In a December 15 memorandum to Helms, Carver stated that Laird was anxious to remove all US military personnel from the PRU program, as were MACV commanding general Creighton Abrams and the JCS. Laird admitted that his concerns were “political,” and he wanted to avoid a flap over the PRU in which US military personnel would be associated. Carver explained that recent steps had been taken to tighten controls over the program, curtail the operational involvement of US military personnel, and shift the emphasis to intelligence collection from ambush or “elimination.” Carver argued that the sudden removal of US military personnel, who were already in the process of being gradually reduced, would be a mistake and would jeopardize the program. Laird agreed to reconsider his view.

The main report gives the level of US involvement, showing the Phoenix personnel were primarily South Vietnamese.

The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) Program in South Vietnam forms an investigative and paramilitary attack upon the covert communist apparatus in South Vietnam. PRU teams, currently totalling approximately 4,200 men, operate in 44 provinces of South Vietnam. PRU are based in their home areas and operate in teams of 15–20 men. They are presently advised and supported by 101 US military advisors and seven CIA personnel. CIA funds the PRU and retains overall administrative control of the project for the US Government.

Reasons against continued CIA involvement included a concern, much like that raised during the Korean War, about diverting CIA from its national-level to a tactical role:

  1. Continued US support of the PRU program risks adverse publicity either through an untoward incident, a press campaign to publicize its efforts or complaints from accommodation-minded South Vietnamese officials or politicians.
  2. CIA will have to continue its support to a program which lies, at least in part, outside its usual intelligence mission.[24]

Vietnam 1969-1972 CIA's pacification programs in Vietnam deteriorated because the Vietnamese chose to not invest in them.[25] Although this is contradicted in the CIA's history books which state that The National Liberation Front was beaten by the pacification programs[26]

Psychological operations

From a psychological operations perspective, The Vietnam War Phoenix Program is controversial to this day. Supporters say that it was a legal and closely controlled US-Vietnamese intelligence program aimed at destroying the Vietcong infrastructure, while the critics say that it was an illegal system of arresting, torturing and murdering innocent Vietnamese civilians...[27]

"Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Directive 381-41, dated 9 July 1967, inaugurated the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) program to Attack the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). In late 1967, MACV replaced the name “ICEX” with “Phoenix,” after a mythical bird that appeared as a sign of prosperity and luck and a near translation of the South Vietnamese name for the program, “Phung Hoang” (All-seeing bird”)."

As early as 1964, GEN William C. Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) "knew that he lacked the forces to wage both a war of attrition and one of pacification, so he chose the former. The argument over whether or not this was the right course of action will likely go on forever, but undoubtedly the shape of the war changed dramatically after the Tet Offensive. The enemy was badly mauled and, despite the political gains made, militarily lost the initiative for quite some time."[20]

When the VC regrouped after the Tet Offensive, "Westmoreland never had such an advantage. When American ground forces entered the war in 1965, they faced an enemy on the offensive, but in June 1968 the new MACV commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, confronted an enemy on the ropes. Abrams plainly recognized his advantage and implemented a clear-and-hold strategy aimed at moving into rural enclaves formerly dominated by the VC."

Much criticized for lack of precision, the Phoenix Program was described by a former official as a "sterile depersonalized murder program...I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through an interrogation" Also many of the people captured under the Phoenix program can be seen as innocent. Many of the thousands of victims were given to the Americans cause of petty disputes among neighbors and for personal gain. Phoenix also had little chance for success excuse the Vietcong had the operation filled with their double agents from the beginning.[28]

Numerous left-wing websites have William Colby assigning an Operation Phoenix body count of 20,587 Vietcong enemy combatants, and have the South Vietnamese Government reporting the death toll as 40,994. Representative of these is page 5 of a book by author Ami Chen Mills[29]

The psy-war tactics that were most usefully used by the Vietcong were the use of Booby Traps. They came in all shapes and sizes and in varying degrees of sophistication, but they had a huge impact of the morale of American troops. These traps were not meant to kill, but instead maim and injure because it instilled more fear in the enemy soldiers, and because it took 4-5 men to care for 1 injured soldier, when a dead soldier would be less of a strain on resources. The Vietcong also used tunnels to their advantage. They could sneak out of their hiding spaces and take out a few American soldiers at a time. This increased the fear of the enemy because attacks could happen at anytime and anywhere[30]

Operation Wandering Soul

Another psychological warfare tactic utilized by the CIA was Operation Wandering Soul. This preyed on the superstitions of the Vietnamese. It was believed that if one died away from one's family and was not buried with their ancestors, then they would be forced to wander forever; their souls in pain. The US recorded tapes of South Vietnamese actors wailing, searching for their loved ones and imploring the Viet Cong to "desert the army to save your soul." These tapes were broadcast by GIs walking about with speakers or by overhead choppers.[31]

This website provides a short recording of one of the tapes used during Operation Wandering Soul. http://pcf45.com/sealords/cuadai/wanderingsoul.html This has unofficially been dubbed as "Ghost Tape No. 10."[32]

Another broadcast used at Nui Ba Den Mountain in 1970 used an actual recording of a tiger from a zoo in Bangkok. A rumor was spread of a tiger attacking the Viet Cong to supplement the playing of the recording. Allegedly, this acted as a catalyst for 150 Viet Cong leaving their positions. Leaflets were also used to amplify this scare tactic.[33]

See also

Declassified CIA documents

Air America

References

  1. ↑
  2. ↑ "CIA and the Vietnam War Declassified part 1". Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  3. ↑ "CIA and the Vietnam War Declassified part 1". Youtube. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  4. ↑ Patti, Archimedes L. A (1980), Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's albatross, University of California Press, ISBN 0520041569
  5. ↑ "CIA and the Vietnam War Declassified Part 2". Youtube. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  6. 1 2 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/
  7. 1 2 3 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/2-CIA_AND_THE_HOUSE_OF_NGO.pdf
  8. ↑ Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam, Center for the Study of Intelligence, October 1998, 243 pp
  9. 1 2 "Document 95, Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955,", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1, pp. 573–83
  10. 1 2 Lansdale, Edward Geary. (1972). In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. New York: Harper and Row. p. 225.
  11. ↑ NIE 63-5-54
  12. ↑ Ahern, Thomas (August 2001). "CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam" (PDF). FOIA. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  13. ↑ http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/2-CIA_AND_THE_HOUSE_OF_NGO.pdf pp. 103–105
  14. ↑ SNIE50-2-64
  15. ↑ Ahern, Thomas. "CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam," (PDF). The CIA's Vietnam Histories. FOIA. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  16. ↑ Central Intelligence Agency (1 October 1964), SNIE 53-2-64 The Situation in South Vietnam (PDF)
  17. ↑ Central Intelligence Agency (July 23, 1965), SNIE 10-9-65: Communist and Free World Reactions to a Possible US Course of Action
  18. ↑ Ahern Jr., Thomas L. (2001) ‘CIA and Rural Pacification in Vietnam (U)’ NSA Archive [online] 279-280, available: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/ [accessed June 23, 2016].
  19. ↑ Ahern, Thomas (June 24, 2016). CIA and the Generals Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnamese (PDF). National Security Information.
  20. 1 2 Andrade, Dale; Willbanks, James H. (March–April 2006), "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future" (PDF), Military Review
  21. ↑ Blakeley, Ruth (2009-04-03). State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780203876510.
  22. ↑ Ahern, Thomas. "CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam," (PDF). FOIA. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  23. ↑ Thomas L. Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954-1963,. Center for the Study of Intelligence, June 2000, 231 pp.
  24. 1 2 Kissinger, Henry (11 December 1969), Memorandum for the 303 Committee: The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Program in Vietnam (PDF), Foreign Relations of the United States, Nixon-Ford Administrations. Volume VI. Foreign Relations, 1969-1976. Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, United States Department of State, FRUS Document 157, archived from the original (PDF) on April 9, 2008
  25. ↑ Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam, Center for the Study of Intelligence, August 2001
  26. ↑ Lewis B. Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Final Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1999
  27. ↑ Friedman, Herbert A., The Phoenix Program
  28. ↑ "COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam - Statement of K. Barton Osborn". August 2, 1971. Retrieved 2007-06-25.
  29. ↑ Mills, Ami Chen (1991), CIA Off Campus: Building the Movement Against Agency Recruitment, South End Press
  30. ↑ "CIA and the Vietnam War Declassified Part 5". Youtube. Retrieved 24 June 2016.
  31. ↑ Tri Tong hop, Kenh Giai. "CIA and the Vietnam War Declassified Part 6". Youtube. Retrieved 2016-06-24.
  32. ↑ Shirley, Robert B. "The Wandering Soul - Psyop Tape of Vietnam". Retrieved 2016-06-24.
  33. ↑ "Trick or Treat - The Strange Tale of Ghost Tape No. 10". Military History Now. Retrieved 2016-07-23.
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